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principlesWe experimentally investigate the relationship between discriminatory behaviour and the perceived social
inappropriateness of discrimination. We conjecture that discrimination will be weaker when social norms
oppose it. Our results support this prediction. Using a Krupka-Weber social norm elicitation task, we ﬁnd
participants perceive it to be more socially inappropriate to discriminate on the basis of nationality than on the
basis of social identities artiﬁcially induced using a trivial minimal group technique. Correspondingly, we ﬁnd
that participants discriminatemore in the artiﬁcial identity setting. Our results suggest norms and the preference
to comply with them affect discriminatory decisions and that the social inappropriateness of discrimination
moderates discriminatory behaviour.e).
. This is an o© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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Allocator game1. Introduction
Economic theories seeking to explain discrimination focus on two
mechanisms. First, in the presence of incomplete information, proﬁt-
or income-maximizing agents use aggregate group characteristics to
form statistical beliefs about individual characteristics and then act in
accordance with those beliefs by, potentially, treating members of
different groups differentially (Arrow, 1972). Second, individuals are
assumed to derive direct utility from favouring certain groups relative
to others, i.e. they are assumed to have a ‘taste for discrimination’
(Becker, 1957). Such tastes explain why discrimination is observed
even in settings where asymmetric or incomplete information is not
an issue (e.g. Chen and Li, 2009; Abbink and Harris, 2012). The focus
of our paper is on this second form of discrimination, taste-based
discrimination, and in particular on the psychological foundations of
the tastes or preferences for discrimination, which have received
remarkably little attention in the literature.
Speciﬁcally, in this paperwe use experimental methods to investigate
whether tastes for discrimination are systematically associatedwith socialpen access article undernorms, i.e. collectively recognised rules of behaviour that deﬁne which
actions are viewed as socially appropriate within a speciﬁc social
group.1 As we discuss further below, there may be a host of factors that
shape the tastes for discrimination, including direct altruism towards
members of one's own social group. The key contribution of our paper
is to provide evidence that one important taste-shaping factor is a
norm-based mechanism that regulates the extent to which actions that
favour one's own group relative to others are regarded as permissible
and appropriate. Uncovering this normative component is an important
step towards understanding how patterns of taste-based discrimination
are shaped.
If social norms moderate the taste for discrimination, the incidence
of discriminatory behaviour should positively correlate with beliefs
about the appropriateness of discrimination. Similar correlations have
been found in relation to other types of economic behaviour. Following
Krupka and Weber (2013), lab and lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiments have
shown that in a variety of economic contexts people are more likely
to take an action the more socially appropriate they perceive it to be
(e.g. Burks and Krupka, 2012 – corporate ethics; Gächter et al., 2013 –1 See Elster (1989) and Ostrom (2000) for deﬁnitions of social norms. See Akerlof and
Kranton (2000, 2005) for a discussion of the importance of norms for discriminatory
behaviour.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Banerjee, 2016 – bribery). There is also evidence from econometric
research (e.g. Buonanno et al., 2009) and natural ﬁeld experiments
(e.g. Allcott, 2011) suggesting norms drive behaviour outside the
lab. Thus, in driving behaviour, social norms may effectively substitute
for laws (e.g. Huang and Wu, 1994), or may complement them
(e.g. Sunstein, 1990; Kübler, 2001; Lazzarini et al., 2004; Posner, 2009;
Benabou and Tirole, 2011).
However, a correlation between individuals' beliefs about the appro-
priateness of discrimination and the prevalence of discriminatory
behaviour is a challenge to document empirically using naturally
occurring data, not least of all because of the difﬁculties associated
with accurately measuring such beliefs.2
Occasionally, attitudinal surveys include questions that can be
interpreted as eliciting respondents' perceptions of the appropriateness
of discrimination. For instance, the 2002 wave of the Scottish Social
Attitudes Survey asked respondents whether they believed that
‘sometimes there is good reason for people to be prejudiced against
certain groups’. One can interpret responses to this question as a proxy
for the perceived social appropriateness of discrimination. Using this
interpretation, we calculated the percentage of residents in each local
authority area of Scotland who agreed with the statement. For each
area, Fig. 1 plots this variable against the number of racist incidents,3
per 100 non-white residents,4 reported to the police in the ﬁnancial
year 2003–4 (Scottish Executive Statistical Bulletin, 2007). A correlation
coefﬁcient of 0.27 between the two variables suggests a positive relation-
ship between the social appropriateness of racial discrimination and the
incidence of racially discriminatory behaviour, which is consistent with
the notion that norms moderate the taste of discrimination.
The acceptability of prejudice-based humour has sometimes been
used as a proxy for the normative appropriateness of discrimination
(see, e.g., Crandall et al., 2002). Fig. 2 plots, over the period 2004 to
2014, the frequency of Google searches in the US for ‘N***** jokes’ (we
apply the censorship for this paper; the original search term was
uncensored5), as a proportion of all Google searches in the US (Google
Trends, 2016). Searching for racist jokes about black people can be
treated as evidence that the searcher perceives discrimination against
black people to be socially appropriate. Fig. 2 also plots, on an annual
basis over the same period, the number of incidents in the US involving
hate crimes motivated by an anti-black bias that were reported to the
FBI, per every 100 people living in areas where the hate crimes are re-
ported (United States Department of Justice, 2015).6 Both the frequency
of anti-black joke searches and the rate of anti-black hate crime
incidents declined considerably over the period. This is suggestive of a
positive relationship in the US between the change over time in the
social appropriateness of discrimination against black people and the
change over time in discriminatory behaviour against black people.
In spite of these examples, the paucity of useful naturally occurring
data with which to investigate the empirical relevance of norms for
discriminatory behaviour advances the case for using experimental
methods to address the question. Our paper does this, with an empirical
strategy relying on four main elements.
First, we use standard experimental techniques to prime partici-
pants to think about particular dimensions of their identities. The2 See Krupka andWeber (2013) andMackie et al. (2015) for a discussion of the difﬁcul-
ties of measuring social norms empirically.
3 The Scottish police deﬁne a racist incident as ‘any incident which is perceived to be
racist by the victim or any other person.’ (Scottish Executive Statistical Bulletin, 2007)
4 The contemporaneous proportion of non-white residents in each Scottish local area is
taken from the 2001 UK Census (National Records of Scotland, 2011).
5 We deliberated over our decision to censor the word, but eventually concluded that
we felt uncomfortable using it uncensored even in a scientiﬁc context. We expect readers
will be able to guess the extremely derogatory term describing black people that we refer
to.
6 We report this, rather than the absolute number of hate crimes, to adjust for the fact
that the population covered by the FBI's hate crime statistics varies from year to year.
The proportion of black people in the covered population is not available.priming aims to trigger a process of social identiﬁcation by encouraging
subjects to identify with half of the participants in their experimental
session and not with the other half.
Second, in the decision-making phase of the experiment we ask
subjects to distribute a given amount of money between two potential
recipients, one an individual sharing their primed identity (‘in-group’),
the other an individual not sharing their primed identity (‘out-group’).
This simple allocation task allows us to measure discrimination as the
extent to which individuals are willing to favour members of their
own social group at the expense of the out-group.
Third, crucially, we exogenously vary the dimension of identity that
is primed. We do this across two treatments that we designed to vary
the perceived appropriateness of discriminating in favour of the
in-group and against the out-group, while holding other aspects of the
decision-making context constant.7 Under one treatment, social identi-
ties are based on nationality; we form groups in the laboratory based on
whether participants are British or Chinese. Under the other treatment,
social identities are entirely artiﬁcial; groups are formed according to
the colour of ball that each participant draws blindly from a bag. We
expect the norms that mandate how a decision-maker should treat
in-groups and out-groups in our experiment to differ across the two
treatments. Speciﬁcally, we expect discrimination against out-group
and in favour of in-group members to be perceived as less appropriate
when identity groups are formed on the basis of nationality than
when they are artiﬁcially formed on the basis of the colour of balls
randomly picked. Indeed, when identity groups are artiﬁcially formed,
participants have no directly relevant social norm to which to refer for
guidance about the social appropriateness of discrimination. If this is
the case, our exogenous manipulation varies the strength of the norm
relating to discrimination across our treatments and, if discrimination
is systematically shaped by norms, we thus expect discrimination to
be stronger between the artiﬁcial groups.
Fourth, aswell asmeasuring discrimination,we directlymeasure the
perceived social appropriateness of discrimination in each treatment.
We do this by employing the ‘norm-elicitation’ task introduced by
Krupka and Weber (2013), in which participants are described the
allocator game and are asked to evaluate the social appropriateness of
each and every possible action available to the allocator. We use this
norm-elicitation task to construct an incentivizedmeasure of the extent
to which participants' perceptions of the appropriateness of discrimina-
tion vary across our two treatments and to examine the extent towhich
these differences in perceived appropriateness translate into differences
in discriminatory behaviour in the allocation task.
Our results show that, in both treatments, discriminatory actions are
viewed as socially inappropriate. However, as expected, discrimination
is perceived to be signiﬁcantly less appropriate in the nationality
treatment compared to the artiﬁcial identity treatment. The results of
the decision task correlate with these differences in perceived appropri-
ateness: while few participants discriminate in either treatment,
discrimination is signiﬁcantly stronger between artiﬁcial groups than
betweennationality groups. These results are consistentwith the notion
that the perceived social appropriateness of discrimination varies
according to the way identity groups are deﬁned, and this corresponds
with individuals' revealed preferences for discrimination.
That discrimination can be observed along a trivial, artiﬁcially-
induced dimension of identity highlights the strength of the human
inclination to discriminate against out-group members, and the ease
with which in-group bias can be triggered (Ashburn-Nardo et al.,
2001). That we observe weaker discrimination when identity is based
upon the more meaningful characteristic of nationality, and that such7 To illustrate the idea that discrimination may be perceived asmore appropriate along
certain dimensions of identity than others, consider sports ormusic fandomversus ethnic-
ity or gender. Normsmay render it appropriate to discriminate against otherswho support
a different football team or listen to a different type of music, but not appropriate to dis-
criminate against others who are different in terms of ethnicity or gender.
Fig. 1. Variations in attitudes towards racial prejudice and race crimes across Scottish local authority areas. Note: Fig. 1 plots, at the level of local authority area, the relationship between
attitudes to prejudice, as reported in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2002, and the frequency of racist incidents reported to the police in the ﬁnancial year 2003–4. Each data-point
represents one local authority area in Scotland.
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that the extent to which human society has been effective in curbing
the inclination to discriminate is owing to the development of shared
norms proscribing this behaviour.
Our study's main contribution is in linking discrimination to social
norms and social identity theory. In this sense, our study is closely
related to the paper by Chang et al. (2017), who investigate the effect
of priming US citizens' political identities on redistributive behaviour.
They show that individuals' primed political identities (Democrat or
Republican) determine their perceptions of the social appropriateness
of redistribution, and that this explains differences in redistributive
behaviour between Democrats and Republicans. Like Chang et al.'s,
our experiment shows that both individuals' distributive decisions and
their perceptions of the social appropriateness of such decisions are
sensitive to the dimension of identity that is salient in a given context.
However, while the normative prescriptions upon which Chang et al.
focus relate to the social identities of the decision-makers alone, we
focus on the social identities of both the decision-makers and other
individuals affected by the decision-makers' behaviour, and on how
those social identities relate one to another. Thus, unlike Chang et al.,
in our experiment both the priming and the distributive decisions
have an intergroup component which allows us to investigate the rela-
tionship between social identities, social norms, and discriminatory
behaviour.
Our paper is also related to work on the associations between social
identity andnormenforcement.8 Bernhard et al. (2006) andGoette et al.
(2006), for instance, use third-party punishment games to study
whether the willingness to enforce norms of sharing and cooperation
depends on the social identities of the norm violator and of the victim
of the norm violation and on how those identities relate to that of the
norm enforcer. Both papers ﬁnd that social identity systematically af-
fects the patterns of norm enforcement: enforcers are generally more
willing to mete out punishment against violators when the victim of
the norm violation is an in-group rather than an out-group member.8 Also relevant is the research, mostly undertaken by psychologists, on the associations
between social norms and the expressions of prejudiced views – a related but different
phenomenon to acts of discrimination. Crandall et al. (2002), for instance, found that ex-
pressions of prejudice towards groups are very strongly correlated with reported beliefs
on the social appropriateness of such prejudice. Other studies have shown that the degree
to which individuals are willing to express prejudice can easily be swayed by the views of
others (Blanchard et al., 1994; Zitek and Hebl, 2007), or by an experimenter deceptively
varying the social norm that is presented to them (Nesdale et al., 2005), suggesting that
normative consideration may play an important role on the expression of prejudice.Also related is Harris et al. (2014), who study whether in-group
favouritism is proscribed by social norms by observing the extent to
which individuals are willing to incur costs to punish it. They ﬁnd that
in-group favouritism goes largely unpunished when the punisher
belongs to the same identity group as the norm violator or when she
belongs to a neutral group. In-group favouritism is instead frequently
punished when the punisher belongs to a different identity group.
Harris et al. conclude that in-group favouritism is not always considered
a violation of social norms, as this depends on the identities of the
agents involved in the interaction.
While these studies strongly suggest an association between dis-
crimination and social norms and identities, none of them has directly
measured the norms that underlie the observed patterns of behaviour.
Moreover, none of these studies has investigated whether variations
in primed social identity trigger differences in norms that, in turn,
predict variations in discrimination. Thus, our study ﬁlls an important
gap in this literature, as we are the ﬁrst to provide direct evidence not
only that discrimination co-varies with social norms, but also that
these norms vary across particular dimensions of an individual's
identity.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 sketches a simple
theoretical model of identity and norm-compliance that we use to
motivate and inform our empirical strategy. Section 3 outlines our
experimental design; Section 4 presents our results; Section 5 concludes
and discusses our ﬁndings.
2. Theoretical framework
Our simple model of social norm-compliance and identity closely
follows Krupka and Weber (2013) and Chang et al. (2017), who based
theirs on Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005). An individual i's utility Ui
depends on the payoff-determining actions of him- or herself and
others, a = (ai,a−i), the social identities of him- or herself and others,
I= (Ii, I−i), and the dimension of identity that is salient in the decision
situation, d:
Ui a; I;dð Þ ¼ Vi að Þ þ Si ajIð Þ þ γiN aijI; dð Þ ð1Þ
We assume that the decision-maker's utility can be broken into three
components. The ﬁrst component, Vi(a), describes individual i's utility
overmaterial payoffs, which in turn depends upon his or her own actions
and the actions of others. Note that this accommodates standard self-
regarding preferences, where the individual only cares about his or her
Fig. 2. Google searches for racist jokes about black people and anti-black hate crimes in the US, 2004–14. Note: The light grey line plots the number of anti-black hate crime incidents
reported to the FBI each year, adjusted for the population size covered by reporting agencies at the time. The dark grey line plots the relative frequency, amongst Google searches in
the US, of the search term ‘N***** jokes’ (censorship applied retrospectively) –monthly data was recovered using the Google Trends tool, and is averaged over the course of each year.
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regarding preferences, where individual i's utility also depends on others'
material payoffs (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). Importantly, this component of utility does not depend on the
identities of the decision-maker or the others.
In contrast, we assume that the second and third components of
utility depend on social identities. These capture the decision-maker's
willingness to treat others differently depending on how those others'
identities compare to his or her own identity. There are several psycho-
logical mechanisms that form the basis for these components. Social
identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), for example, posits that dis-
crimination helps individuals satisfy their need for positive self-esteem
since it confers a relatively high status on the in-group at the expense
of the out-group. Subjective uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg,
2000) takes a different approach: individuals strive to reduce uncer-
tainty about their attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions. Self-categorization
and identiﬁcation with groups that provide normative prescriptions
for behaviour can reduce this uncertainty and lead to differential treat-
ment of in-groups and out-groups.
We view these psychologicalmechanisms as distalmotivations for the
‘taste for discrimination’ that has been discussed in the economics litera-
ture. In ourmodelweoperationalise thesemechanisms using twodistinct
components of utility. The component Si(a| I) captureswhat has tradition-
ally been thought of as the taste for discrimination, i.e. utility derived by
individual i from i's and others' material payoffs that is conditional on
how the social identities of individual i and the others relate, one to an-
other. In our model, this component of utility can be thought of as primal
– as the direct utility that is or would be derived from favouring the in-
group in the absence of any self-moderation. As in the utility functions
proposed by McLeish and Oxoby (2007), Chen and Li (2009), and Chen
and Chen (2011), this component of utility is not conditional on which
speciﬁc dimension of identity is salient in the decision-making environ-
ment. Rather, we simply assume that i places a higher weight on the ma-
terial payoffs of those players who are in-group, i.e., have the same social
identity as him- or herself, as compared to the payoffs of players who are
out-group, i.e., have a different identity.9 This can accommodate simple
forms of favouritism towards the in-group, such as in-group altruism, as
well as more complex forms of identity-contingent other-regarding9 During our analysis in Section 4,we investigatewhether this assumption should be re-
laxed, i.e., whether utility from in-group favouritism depends on the dimension of identity
that is salient in the decision situation.preferences, as in the models by Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen
(2011).
The third component of utility in ourmodel, γiN(ai| I,d), captures the
decision-maker's preference to self-moderate his or her primal inclination
to favour the in-group with reference to what is or is not socially appro-
priate. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the individual derives utility from
complying with normative prescriptions, captured by the function N(.),
which deﬁnes the social appropriateness of each action ai available to in-
dividual i. These normative prescriptions dependon social identities. They
may, for example, prescribe different behaviours towards in-group and
out-group others. In addition, these prescriptions depend on the dimen-
sion of social identity, d, that is salient given the decision-making context.
So, the same action may be viewed as more or less socially appropriate
depending not only on how the identities of the decision-maker and
others compare, but also on what dimension of identity it is appropriate
or meaningful to compare given the context. In some contexts, this
third term mitigates the second. For example, an individual might have
a primal desire to directmildly insulting comments atmembers of an eth-
nic group other than his or her own, but refrains from doing so because it
is socially inappropriate. In other contexts, this third term may build on
the second. For example, an individual might have a primal desire to di-
rect mildly insulting comments at the supporters of a soccer team other
than the one he or she supports and is furthermotivated to do so because,
especially onmatchdays, suchbehaviour is socially appropriate. Finally,γi
is an individual-speciﬁc parameter deﬁning the importance that individ-
ual i attaches to complying with social norms.
In our experiment, subjects face a simple allocation task (described
in detail in the next section), where they have to divide an amount of
money between two other participants. In all treatments of the experi-
ment, we keep constant the set of material payoffs available to players
and the mapping from actions into payoffs. Thus, the ﬁrst component
Vi(a) of the utility function above is held constant across treatments
for any given set of actions a.
Moreover, in all treatments subjects are asked to divide the money
between a participant who belongs to the same identity group as them-
selves and a participant who belongs to a different identity group. Thus,
the second component Si(a| I) of the utility function is also kept constant
across treatments.
Our treatments vary the dimension of identity d that is made salient
to the decision-makers and, hence, the process by which the relevant
identity groups are deﬁned in the experiment. As we describe in detail
in the next section, in one treatment identity groups are formed on
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groups are based on a meaningful personal characteristic. An implica-
tion of this treatment manipulation is that the normative prescriptions,
N(ai| I,d), that regulate the third component of the utility function
described above, may differ across treatments. Speciﬁcally, the same
action ai available to the decision-maker may be evaluated differently
depending on how identity groups are formed. Our experiment empir-
ically explores the effect of varying the salient dimension of identity on
the normative prescriptions relating to discriminatory behaviour and
the role of these normative prescriptions in predicting such behaviour.
Note that our model does not specify ex-ante the underlying
determinants of the perceptions of appropriate behaviour captured by
the function N(.), or how these will vary across treatments. Instead, we
follow Krupka and Weber (2013) and Chang et al. (2017) and employ a
norm-elicitation technique to quantify, in an incentive-compatible way,
the function N(.) in each treatment.10 This allows us to assess empirically
the extent towhich normative prescriptions do indeed differ across treat-
ments; and thereby examine the extent to which differences between
treatments in the level of discrimination in the allocation task are
predicted by differences in the perception of its appropriateness.
3. Experimental design
3.1. Measuring discrimination – the allocator game
In the allocator game, one participant was endowed with £16 and
asked to allocate it between two passive players, one belonging to his or
her own identity group and the other belonging to a different identity
group.11 The decision-maker could not keep any of the money for him-
or herself but knew he or she would receive a payment, between £6
and £10, which the computer would randomly pick at the end of the
experiment.12 Allocators could split the money any way they liked
between the other two players, as long as each amount was a multiple
of two. Thus, the allocator had to choose one of nine possible allocations
of money between the two passive players, ranging from (£16; £0) to
(£0; £16). In order to maximize sample sizes, we elicited decisions
using a role randomisation method: all participants were asked to make
a decision in the allocator role knowing that their actual role would be
determined at random at the end of the experiment (participants had a
one-third chance of being assigned the allocator role and a two-thirds
chance of being assigned a passive player role). Role assignment was
implemented at the end of experiment, once everyone had submitted
an allocation decision. Decisions were made anonymously and the only
information allocators had about their recipients was the identity group
that each of them belonged to.
We chose the allocator game as our discrimination-eliciting device for
the following reasons. First, given our focus on taste-baseddiscrimination,
wewanted a decision-making taskwithinwhich statistical discrimination
had no relevance; in the allocator game the decision-maker's material
payoff does not depend on what any other player does, so statistical be-
liefs about other players are irrelevant.13 Second, tomaximize our chances
of discerning treatment differences, we wanted a task that reliably10 This is one of the main advantages of the social norms approach proposed by Krupka
and Weber (2013) since the researcher does not have to rely on introspection or casual
empiricism to specify ex-ante the underlying normative structure of the decision situation
he or she is interested in studying, but can rather let this be revealed directly by the data.
11 See Supplementary Online Materials A for a copy of the instructions used in the
experiments.
12 Thepossible paymentswere £6, £8 and £10; eachhad 1/3probability of occurring. Our
aim was to pay allocators £8 on average. However, had we made this payoff a certainty it
might have inﬂated the salience of the (8,8) split in the allocator game, as this allocation
would ensure payoff equality across all three players.
13 Note that given the non-strategic nature of the allocator game certain elements of the
utility function set out in the previous section are redundant. This notwithstanding the
proposed framework remains relevant. In Section 4, for the purpose of analysis, we set
out a parameterised version of the utility function that is directly and entirely relevant
to the game.produces discriminatory behaviour and, in a meta-analysis, Lane (2016)
found the allocator game to be the experimental task that yielded the
strongest discrimination. Finally, in the allocator game it is obvious to par-
ticipants what the experiment is about and any observed discrimination
is interpretable as conscious rather than subconscious. Thus, the game is
an ideal subject for a norm-elicitation task; it is much simpler to assess
the social appropriateness of conscious behaviour than of subconscious
behaviour.
3.2. Measuring the social appropriateness of discrimination – the Krupka-
Weber norm-elicitation task
We elicited the social appropriateness of discrimination in the
allocator game using an adaptation of the task design pioneered by
Krupka and Weber (2013). Participants were described the allocator
game, were presented with a table listing the nine possible actions an
allocator could take, and were asked to evaluate the social appropriate-
ness of each by selecting one option on a four-point scale: ‘Very socially
inappropriate’, ‘Somewhat socially inappropriate’, ‘Somewhat socially
appropriate’ or ‘Very socially appropriate.’
To ensure that the relevant perceptions of appropriateness are
measured, the evaluators should be, to the greatest extent possible, in
the mind-set of the person making the decision they are evaluating. In
our experiment, in contrast to the original Krupka and Weber method,
participants in the norm-elicitation task were the same as those playing
the allocator game. This allows us to look at within-individual correla-
tions between norms and actions. To facilitate an investigation into
whether this had implications for either the behavioural or normative
data, we varied which task came ﬁrst (participants were unaware of
the content of the second task until they had completed the ﬁrst).14
All participants were assigned to identity groups before their ﬁrst task,
so those taking the norm-elicitation task ﬁrst had had their identities
primed in exactly the same way as the allocator game participants
whose behaviour they were evaluating. Each individual in the norm-
elicitation task only evaluated the appropriateness of actions made by
allocators of the same identity group.
The evaluation of actionswas incentivised. Participantswere told that,
at the end of the experiment, one of the nine actions they had evaluated
would be randomly selected, and each participant's evaluation of the ac-
tionwould be compared to that of another randomly selected participant.
If a participant's evaluation matched that of the person they were com-
pared with, that participant would earn £8; otherwise they would earn
nothing. These incentives transform the task into a coordination game,
where participants are incentivised to match other participants' evalua-
tions of appropriateness. Krupka and Weber (2013) argue that this
gives participants an incentive to reveal their perception of what is com-
monly regarded as appropriate or inappropriate behaviour in the decision
situation, rather than their own personal evaluation of the actions they
are asked to consider. This is important because social norms are collec-
tively recognised rules of behaviour, rather than personal opinions
about behaviours (e.g. Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 2000).
Moreover, because we wanted to incentivise participants to coordi-
nate on identity-speciﬁc social norms (i.e. the social norms that were
recognised by those belonging to a speciﬁc identity group), participants
were told that the person whose evaluation theirs would be compared
towould be amember of their own identity group. Participantswere told:
‘By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most
participants [of your group] would agree is the “correct” thing to do.
Another way to think about what we mean is that if [the allocator]
were to select a socially inappropriate action, then another participant
[of your group] might be angry at [the allocator].’14 See also Erkut et al. (2015) and D'Adda et al. (2016) for further evidence on the valid-
ity of the Krupka and Weber elicitation task in within-subject experimental designs.
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Our treatments, labelled Nationality and Artiﬁcial, differed in the way
identity groupswere formed. InNationalityparticipants in the experiment
were segregated into identity groups based on nationality (previous
economics studies taking this approach include Netzer and Sutter, 2009;
Guillen and Ji, 2011; Goerg et al., 2016). In Artiﬁcial participants were
split into ‘minimal groups’, using a variant of the technique ﬁrst intro-
duced by Tajfel et al. (1971), wherein social identities are artiﬁcially
instilled in participants during the experiment.
For both treatmentswe recruited British and Chinese students at the
UK campus of the University of Nottingham, a British institution which
hosts a large number of students from China.15 In the Nationality
treatment, upon arrival, the British were seated on one side of the lab
and the Chinese on the other. At every computer terminal on the British
(Chinese) side was placed a sign reading ‘YOU ARE ON THE BRITISH
(CHINESE) SIDE OF THE ROOM. ALL PARTICIPANTS ON THIS SIDE OF
THE ROOM ARE BRITISH (CHINESE)’ (see Supplementary Online
Materials B). In the instructions at the beginning of the experiment, it
was again made explicitly clear that the lab and the participants had
been divided based on nationality.
In theArtiﬁcial treatment, upon arrival, participants blindly drewaball
from a bag. In each session the bag initially contained equal numbers of
green and yellow balls, and participants continued to draw from it until
the bag was empty, thus ensuring an equal split of green and yellow
balls drawn. Those with green balls were then seated on one side of the
lab, and those with yellow on the other. Consistent with the Nationality
treatment, signs were placed at each terminal, reading ‘YOU ARE ON
THE GREEN (YELLOW) SIDE OF THE ROOM. ALL PARTICIPANTS ON THIS
SIDE OF THE ROOM DREW A GREEN (YELLOW) BALL’, and it was again
made explicit at the beginning of the instructions that the lab and the par-
ticipants had been divided on the basis of ball colour.
As in the Nationality treatment, we invited an equal mix of British
and Chinese students to the Artiﬁcial sessions. This ensures comparabil-
ity between the two treatments.16
We conjectured that the normative prescriptions regulating the
third component of utility in Eq. (1) would differ across the two
treatments. Speciﬁcally, we conjectured that favouring the in-group at
the expense of the out-group would be viewed as less appropriate in
theNationality compared to the Artiﬁcial treatment. This speciﬁc conjec-
ture was derived from the following assumptions and observations.
First, we considered the Nationality treatment. In Britain, a liberal soci-
etywith a long history of in-migration, it seemed reasonable to assume:
ﬁrst, the existence of a norm proscribing discrimination against people
from nations other than one's own; and second, that both the British
and the Chinese participants in our experiment recognised such a
norm and its relevance under theNationality treatment. Under these as-
sumptions, the third component of utility in Eq. (1) is discrimination
prohibiting.
Second,we considered theArtiﬁcial treatment. In this case, therewas
no directly relevant social norm to which participants could refer.15 Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), an online database of exper-
imental participants, upon which participants are asked to state their nationality when
they sign up. We were able to cross-check nationalities using the University of
Nottingham's central student register system, which lists students' ofﬁcial nationalities.
Note that we based the groups in our experiment on ofﬁcial nationalities, rather than
self-identiﬁed ones (e.g. we did not invite Malaysian students who listed their nationality
as Chinese). Chinese participantsweremainlanders, with none fromHongKong,Macao or
Taiwan.
16 Given the relatively small Chinese community in Nottingham, Chinese participants in
our experiment were more likely to know each other than were the British. This could be
problematic if, particularly in theNationality treatment, participants based their behaviour
on the number of friends they had on either sideof the lab.We controlled for this by asking
each participant, in the post-experimental questionnaire, how many people on each side
of the lab they had previously met. Chinese participants were indeedmore likely to know
each other, but there was no association between the number of friends on either side of
the lab and participants' behaviour in either treatment (available on request).However, we conjectured that participants could have referred to one
or more apparently partially relevant social prescriptions or norms.17
So for some, the speciﬁcs of the Artiﬁcial treatment could have brought
to mind dimensions of identity such as nationality or ethnicity.
However, it seemed reasonable to assume that for others it would
have been more likely to invoke dimensions of identity such as sports
fandom and team game-playing, across which discrimination is con-
doned. Thus, we conjectured that, under Artiﬁcial, to the extent that
any normative prescription or prescriptions were regulating the third
component of utility in Eq. (1), on average, they would be less discrim-
ination prohibiting than those at work under Nationality.
Finally, we noted that this conjecture is consistent with the fact that
previous experiments priming national identity (e.g. Goerg et al., 2016;
Netzer and Sutter, 2009;Willinger et al., 2003) have often not found sig-
niﬁcant discrimination, while experiments involving minimal group
identity (e.g., Ahmed, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Hargreaves Heap and
Zizzo, 2009) do so more frequently.18 Indeed, according to a recent
meta-analysis by Lane (2016), on average, discrimination is signiﬁ-
cantly weaker in the former compared to the latter type of experiment.
3.4. Procedure
All participants participated in both the allocator game and the
norm-elicitation task, as well as completing a post-experimental
questionnaire. In each session, everyone received payment either for
the allocator game or for the norm-elicitation task, as determined by a
coin toss at the end of the experiment. Participants also received a £4
show-up fee. The order in which the tasks were performed was
randomised between sessions, so that we could check for ordering ef-
fects. We do not ﬁnd such effects (see Supplementary Online Materials
C for the analysis), which is consistent with the ﬁndings of Erkut et al.
(2015) and D'Adda et al. (2016). Therefore, in the analysis below we
pool across ordering conditions. All sessions had 24 participants –
twelve belonging to each group – and were conducted in March or
April 2015, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We conducted ten
sessions, with 120 participants participating in each treatment.19
4. Results
4.1. Treatment differences – social norms
We look ﬁrst at the social appropriateness of discrimination in each
treatment, as measured by the norm-elicitation task. Fig. 3 plots
the mean appropriateness ratings assigned to each allocation in the
Nationality and Artiﬁcial treatments. Following the approach of Krupka
and Weber (2013), we assign evenly-spaced values of−1 for the rating
‘very socially inappropriate’,−0.33 for the rating ‘somewhat socially in-
appropriate’, 0.33 for the rating ‘somewhat socially appropriate’ and 1
for the rating ‘very socially appropriate.’ The table at the bottomof theﬁg-
ure displays the distribution of evaluations for each allocation in each
treatment, and presents the results of randomisation tests on the treat-
ment differences in mean ratings. Our results are corrected for the fact
that we are performing multiple tests; applying the Benjamini-
Hochberg False Discovery Rate method (Benjamini and Hochberg,17 Hertel andKerr (2001) present evidence that supports thenotion that participants in a
minimal groupparadigmmay refer tomultiple, partially relevant normative prescriptions,
by showing that discrimination can bemanipulated by priming, alternatively, principles of
loyalty or equality.
18 Interestingly, however, a number of previous studies have failed to ﬁnd strong dis-
crimination in minimal group experiments conducted in China (see Cadsby et al., 2016,
Section 3.1). This raises the possibility that discriminatory behaviour by Chinese partici-
pants may be difﬁcult to observe. Our experimental evidence, discussed below, does not
support this conjecture.
19 We conducted one additional session in the Artiﬁcial treatment which we exclude
from the analysis. This is due to procedural issues that resulted from a low turn-up rate.
Excluding the session does not meaningfully affect any important results.
Fig. 3. Perceived social appropriateness of actions in allocator game. Notes: Fig. 3 presents the distribution of social appropriateness ratings of each allocation in the two treatments.
Allocations (e.g. 16,0) are denoted by the amount given to the in-group member on the left (£16), and the amount given to the out-group member on the right (£0). Shaded cells
represent the modal ratings for each allocation in each treatment. Mean ratings are taken by assigning values of 1, 0.33,−0.33 and−1 for the ratings ‘very appropriate’, ‘somewhat
appropriate’, ‘somewhat inappropriate’ and ‘very inappropriate’ respectively, and averaging the values for all participants in a given treatment. Benjamini-Hochberg-corrected p-values
are reported from randomisation tests.
159A. Barr et al. / Journal of Public Economics 164 (2018) 153–1641995), we sort our p-values in ascending rank and multiply each by the
number of separate tests being performed (in our case nine, one for
each possible allocation) before dividing each by its rank – thus greater
adjustments are made to smaller p-values.2020 All p-values reported in this paper are two-sided, based on Fisher randomisation tests
and corrected using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method. See Moir
(1998) for a discussion of the randomisation test, and Kaiser and Lacy (2009) for informa-
tion on the Stata command used to apply it.In each treatment the mean and modal evaluations follow the same
general pattern. Participants tend to regard extreme discrimination
against recipients belonging to either identity group to be very socially
inappropriate, while the equal split is generally regarded as very socially
appropriate. There is a lack of strong consensus on allocations mildly
favouringmembers of one group or the other. This pattern is consistent
with a social norm of equality. However, in both treatments the per-
ceived social appropriateness decays faster as allocations move away
from equality towards favouring the out-group member than when
24 An alternative explanation could be that it is participants' behaviour in the allocator
game that shapes the appropriateness ratings they supply in the norm-elicitation task.
For instance, participants may reﬂect on the way they behaved – or, for those playing
the allocator game second, the way they think they would behave – and assume others
would consider this an appropriateway to act. Althoughwe cannot eliminate this possibil-
ity, we can investigate whether, if we hold behaviour constant by focusing on those who
did not discriminate in the allocator game (76% of the sample), we can still observe a dif-
ference in the social appropriateness of discrimination across treatments. This analysis re-
veals that discrimination is perceived to be more inappropriate in the Nationality
160 A. Barr et al. / Journal of Public Economics 164 (2018) 153–164they move towards favouring the in-group member, indicating that
social norms against discrimination are stronger when the victim is a
member of one's own identity group.21
By design, any treatment differences in the ratings assigned to a
given allocation can only be driven by contextual differences in the
perceived appropriateness of discrimination. We observe subtle but
signiﬁcant treatment differences. Whereas 95% of participants in the
Nationality treatment perceive the equal split to be very appropriate, the
equivalent ﬁgure is only 84.2% in the Artiﬁcial treatment; mean ratings
for the equal split are signiﬁcantly higher in the Nationality treatment.
Furthermore, as the allocations move away from the equal split towards
favouring the in-group, the appropriateness ratings decline at a faster
rate in the Nationality treatment than in the Artiﬁcial treatment. For the
extreme (16,0) split, 92.5% of participants in the Nationality treatment
opt for ‘very inappropriate’, while only 80.8% do so in the Artiﬁcial treat-
ment. And while only 5% of participants rate the (16,0) allocation as so-
cially appropriate in the Nationality treatment, 18% do so in the Artiﬁcial
treatment. In fact, Fig. 3 shows that, for any in-group-favouring allocation,
there are more participants in the Artiﬁcial than Nationality treatment
who ﬁnd discrimination to be socially appropriate.22
As a consequence, all in-group-favouring allocations are, on average,
perceived to be more appropriate in the Artiﬁcial treatment, and the
differences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in three
out of the four possible cases (the exception being the allocation 14, 2
for which the difference is signiﬁcant at the 10% level). Moreover, the
differences in perception of appropriateness of discrimination only per-
tain to in-group favouritism and not to any formof discrimination; Fig. 3
shows that, while out-group-favouring allocations are, on average,
perceived to be slightly more appropriate in the Artiﬁcial treatment,
only for the (6,10) allocation is the difference signiﬁcant, and then
only at the 10% level.23
4.2. Treatment differences – discrimination
Fig. 4 presents the distribution of decisions made in the allocator
game in each treatment. In the Nationality treatment, 83.3% of partici-
pants choose to allocate the money evenly between the in-group
member and the out-group member. Only 69.2% of the participants in
the Artiﬁcial treatment make this choice. The remainder of participants
in each treatment discriminate against out-group members; no partici-
pant in either treatment allocates more money to the out-group mem-
ber than the in-group member. 12.5% of participants in the Artiﬁcial
treatment allocate all the money to the in-group member, while only
4.2% do so in the Nationality treatment.
In theNationality treatment, participants allocate an average of £8.67
to the in-group member and £7.33 to the out-group member, resulting
in a mean difference of £1.33. In the Artiﬁcial treatment, participants al-
locate an average of £9.52 to the in-groupmember and £6.48 to the out-
groupmember, resulting in amean difference of £3.03. A randomisation21 OLS regressions conﬁrm that, in both treatments, the rate of decay of appropriateness
of allocations favouring the out-group is signiﬁcantly higher than that of allocations
favouring the in-group.
22 In Supplementary Online Materials D we show that these average treatment differ-
ences are driven by systematic cross-treatment variations in subjects' response patterns
to thenorm-elicitation task. In particular, in the Artiﬁcial treatmentmore subjects assigned
the highest appropriateness rating to the (16,0) allocation and then monotonically de-
creasing ratings of appropriateness as more money was given to the out-group member.
This is consistent with a social norm of in-group favouritism.
23 Fig. 3 also suggests and further analysis conﬁrms that theperceived appropriateness of
discrimination variesmore in the Artiﬁcial compared to theNationality treatment. The var-
iance in appropriateness is signiﬁcantly (5% level) greater in the Artiﬁcial compared to the
Nationality treatment for 5 out of the 9 possible allocations and, for the remaining 4, we
cannot reject the null of equal variance (p-values adjusted for multiple tests using the
Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method). This is consistent with our argument
that, in the Artiﬁcial treatment, the participants could have referred to a variety of appar-
ently partially relevant social prescriptions or norms. An interesting avenue for further re-
search would be to explore the impact that this normative uncertainty and heterogeneity
may have on behaviour.test indicates that the mean difference in the Artiﬁcial treatment is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than that in the Nationality treatment (p = 0.007).
This is consistent with the conjecture that discrimination is stronger in
the treatment where it is perceived to be more socially appropriate. It
suggests that norm-compliance moderates discriminatory behaviour.24
In Table 1, an OLS regression conﬁrms that the treatment effect on
discrimination is robust to the inclusion of various controls – such as
age, gender, nationality and the extent to which participants under-
stand the tasks.25,26
4.3. Econometric analysis of individual perceptions of social appropriateness
and behaviour
So far we have analysed the link between behaviour and norms at
the group level, by showing that there is more discrimination in the
treatment where it is perceived as less socially inappropriate. We now
exploit the within-subject nature of our experiment to extend the
analysis to the individual level. Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether a
model that incorporates a preference for norm compliance is better
able to explain the behavioural regularities in our experiment than a
model that does not incorporate such a factor.
Following the theoretical framework introduced in Section 2, we
assume that the utility that allocators derive from choosing allocation
x depends on three components, deﬁned respectively on material
payoffs, identity-contingent preferences over material payoffs, and
normative prescriptions. We assume that the ﬁrst component depends
on the squared difference between the material payoffs of the two
passive players implied by allocation x.
The second component depends on the material payoff of the
passive player who shares the same identity as the allocator. The third
component depends on the social appropriateness of the allocation.
For allocator i,
Ui axð Þ ¼ v π j axð Þ−πk axð Þ
 2 þ s ∥Ii¼I jπ j axð Þ þ ∥Ii¼Ikπk axð Þ
h i
þ γNi axð Þ ð2Þ
where πj(ax) and πk(ax) are the material payoffs that the two passive
players j and k receive from allocation x; ∥Ii=Ij and ∥Ii=Ik are indicator
functions that take value 1 if the allocator i and player j (or k) belong to
the same group and 0 otherwise; and Ni(ax) is the social appropriatenesstreatment than the Artiﬁcial treatment evenwhen behaviour is constant (see Supplemen-
tary Online Materials E). The pattern of evaluations is similar to that reported in Figure 3.
The differences for all allocations are in the expected direction, although after applying the
Benjamini-Hochberg adjustment the treatment difference is signiﬁcant at the 10% level
only for the (16,0) allocation, possibly reﬂecting the smaller sample size.
25 Table 1 also reveals that Chinese participants discriminated more than British partici-
pants. We also found that, under both the Artiﬁcial and Nationality treatments, Chinese
participants perceived discrimination to be less socially inappropriate than British partic-
ipants. These cross-national differences are explored inmore detail in Supplementary On-
line Materials F. One possible reason for the stronger discrimination and more favourable
perception of it by the Chinese in our experiment could be their minority status within
Britain; there is some evidence that belonging to a minority group may lead one to have
stronger discriminatory preferences (Chen et al., 2014; Tanaka and Camerer, 2016).
26 We ran further models on the British and Chinese sub-samples to investigate the ef-
fects on discrimination of several other variables which were nationality-speciﬁc. These
variableswere not signiﬁcant. For the British,we found no signiﬁcant effect on discrimina-
tion of: ethnicity, political persuasion, views on immigration, or hostility towards foreign
students. For the Chinese, we found no signiﬁcant effect of: views towards foreigners in
China, feeling welcome in the UK, or hostility towards domestic students. Output is avail-
able on request.
Fig. 4.Discrimination in the allocator game. Notes: Fig. 4 shows the percentage of participants in each treatment who choose each allocation. Allocations are denoted by the amount given
to the in-group member on the left, and the amount given to the out-group member on the right – e.g. (16,0) denotes allocating £16 to the in-group member and £0 to the out-group
member.
Table 1
OLS regressions of treatment differences in discrimination.
Dependent variable = Difference in amount allocated
to in-group member and out-group member
OLS model OLS model
Treatment
Artiﬁcial 1.700⁎⁎⁎ (0.605) 1.974⁎⁎⁎ (0.626)
Controls
Male 0.229 (0.664)
Age −0.121 (0.229)
Year of study −0.280 (0.379)
Chinese 2.212⁎⁎⁎ (0.802)
Misunderstanding 0.875 (0.687)
Rural background 0.637 (0.705)
Economics student −0.060 (0.775)
Constant 1.333 (0.428) 3.113 (4.003)
R2 0.032 0.082
N 240 234
Standard errors in parentheses. Misunderstanding=number of control questions answered
incorrectly at ﬁrst attempt; Six observations dropped from model with controls owing to
missing data for age and year of study.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Table 2
Conditional logit regressions of the likelihood of choosing an action.
Dependent variable = 1 if action is chosen; 0 otherwise
Model (A) (B)
v (weight on payoff inequality) −0.022⁎⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002)
s (weight on in-group altruism) 0.194⁎⁎⁎ 0.206⁎⁎⁎
(0.032) (0.050)
γ (weight on normative prescriptions) 1.414⁎⁎⁎
(0.104)
Pseudo R2 0.277 0.520
Bayesian Information Criterion 778.12 529.04
Number of Observations 2160 2160
161A. Barr et al. / Journal of Public Economics 164 (2018) 153–164that allocator i ascribes to allocation x, asmeasured in thenorm-elicitation
task.27
The parameter v captures the weight that the allocator places on the
material payoff component of the utility function, regardless of the
identities of the passive players: allocations that implement unequal pay-
offs carry the sameweight to utility, regardless of whether the inequality
favours the in-group or out-group. Thus, the parameter v simply captures
(identity-blind) preferences associated with payoff inequality.
In contrast, the parameters s and γ capture the weight that the
allocator places on the components of utility that are contingent on
the identities of the passive players. The parameter s captures simple
in-group altruism: the allocator places an extra weight on the material
payoff of the passive player who belongs to the same group as him- or
herself (and zero weight on the payoff of the out-group). Finally, the
parameter γ captures the weight that allocators place on (identity-
related) normative prescriptions.
Following Gächter et al. (2013) and Krupka and Weber (2013), we
use ﬁxed-effects conditional logit regressions to estimate the weights
v, s and γ on the three components of the utility function shown in
Eq. (2). Speciﬁcally, we assume that allocators choose allocations
following a logit choice rule, whereby the likelihood of choosing each
of the nine possible allocations depends on the utility associated with
that choice, U(ax), relative to the utility associated with the alternative
allocations:
Pr a ¼ axð Þ ¼ exp U axð Þf gX
l¼1;…;9
exp U alð Þf g
; x ¼ 1;…;9 ð3Þ
Our objective, here, is to show that a norm-augmented model is
better able to capture the data patterns observed in the experiment
than a model which contains only the ﬁrst two components of utility
captured in Eq. (2) above. Thus, in Table 2 we report the output of two
ﬁxed-effects conditional logitmodels, each estimated using all of the allo-
cation decisions and, in Model (B), all of the social appropriateness27 Recall that our experiment delivers, for each allocator i, ameasurement of i's perceived
social appropriateness of allocation x. This is because each participant in our experiment
made decisions in both the allocation task and the norm-elicitation task.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
Fig. 5. Actual choice rates in the allocator game and choice rates predicted by conditional logits. Notes: Fig. 5 shows the percentage of participants in each treatment who choose each
allocation, compared to the percentages of participants choosing each allocation in each treatment as predicted by conditional logit models; left-hand panel: model only taking into
account considerations for material payoffs and in-group altruism, right-hand panel: model augmented by normative considerations; allocations are denoted by the amount given to
the in-group member followed by amount given to the out-group member – e.g. (16,0) denotes allocating £16 to the in-group member and £0 to the out-group member.
28 Note also that, the Bayesian Information Criterion is not signiﬁcantly different be-
162 A. Barr et al. / Journal of Public Economics 164 (2018) 153–164evaluations generated under either the Nationality or the Artiﬁcial treat-
ment. In the ﬁrst model we impose the restriction γ= 0 to the utility
function in Eq. (2) and, thus, estimate a choice model where the
decision-maker is purely concerned with payoff inequality and simple
in-group altruism. In the second model this restriction is removed and
utility is allowed to depend on payoff inequality, simple in-group altru-
ism, and the individual's normative evaluation of the action under
consideration.
The signiﬁcant negative estimates of v in both models indicate that
actionswhich yield larger payoff inequalities are less likely to be chosen.
The estimate of s is positive and signiﬁcant in both models, indicating
that allocations which favour the in-group are more likely to be chosen.
Finally, the signiﬁcant positive estimate of γ in model (B) indicates
that an individual is more likely to choose actions he or she perceives
to be more socially appropriate. The signiﬁcant estimate of γ in a
model that also includes the v and s parameters indicates that the
normative component of the utility function can explain variation in
choice behaviour that cannot be entirely captured by (identity-blind)
inequality considerations combined with simple in-group altruism.
This also explains why the Bayesian Information Criterion is signiﬁ-
cantly lower for model (B) than (A) (p b 0.001 on a likelihood-ratio
test) indicating that the norm-augmented model ﬁts the data signiﬁ-
cantly better than the model without norms.
The reason why the norm-augmented model performs better is
made clear in Fig. 5, inwhich the aggregate action choice rates predicted
by each of the models are graphed next to the actual choice rates (as
displayed in Fig. 4). The left-hand panel of Fig. 5 presents the choice
rates predicted by model (A). The right-hand panel presents the choice
rates predicted bymodel (B). For ease of comparison, actual choice rates
are reproduced in both panels. In each panel, the predicted choice rates
(striped bars) and actual choice rates (shaded bars) of the Nationality
(Artiﬁcial) treatment are shown in dark (light) grey.
Model (A), in which participants care only about inequality and
in-group altruism, captures some important aspects of the choice data.
In particular, themodel predicts that deviations fromequality are asym-
metric across the choice space. That is, the probability of choosing an
unequal and in-group-favouring allocation is predicted to be higher
than that of choosing an allocation which creates the same payoff
inequality but favours the out-group. This is what we observe in theactual choice data, as no-one chooses out-group-favouring allocations,
while 24% of participants choose an in-group-favouring allocation.
However, Model (A) fails to capture a second key feature of the
choice data, the difference in allocations across treatments. In contrast,
the norm-augmented model (B) predicts a lower probability of choos-
ing the equal split allocation and higher probabilities of choosing in-
group-favouring allocations in the Artiﬁcial compared to the Nationality
treatment. This is in line with what we observed in the experiment.
Moreover, although the model still assigns positive probabilities to
out-group-favouring allocations, they are markedly lower than those
predicted by Model (A).
Before concluding, we need to investigate whether identity-
contingent preferences over material payoffs (captured by the term s
[∥Ii=Ijπj(ax) + ∥Ii=Ikπk(ax)] in Eq. (2)) depend on the dimension of social
identity that is salient in the decision-making situation. We would
expect to observe such a dependence if, for example, in-group altruism
varies depending on how strongly individuals identify with the group
and this, in turn, depends on the dimension of identity along which
groups are deﬁned.
To explore this, we consider the following alternative utility
speciﬁcation:
Ui axð Þ ¼ v π j axð Þ−πk axð Þ
 2 þ s ∥Ii¼I jπ j axð Þ þ ∥Ii¼Ikπk axð Þ
h i
þ σ∥d¼nationality ∥Ii¼I jπ j axð Þ þ ∥Ii¼Ikπk axð Þ
h i
þ γNi axð Þ ð4Þ
which is identical to Eq. (2) except for the inclusion of the third
term, that captures the incremental utility from in-group altruism
when identities are deﬁned over national groups (∥d=nationality is
an indicator variable that takes value 1whengroups are based onnational
identities). Thus, in Eq. (4) s captures in-group altruism towardsminimal
groups, while s+ σ captures in-group altruism towards national groups.
In Table 3 we use a ﬁxed-effects conditional logit regression to estimate
the weights v, γ, s and σ.
Here, as in Model (B) in Table 2, v is highly signiﬁcant and negative
and both γ and s are highly signiﬁcant and positive, while the newly
added σ is statistically insigniﬁcant.28 Thus, we cannot reject the nulltween themodel in Table 3 andmodel (B) in Table 2 (p=0.195 on a likelihood-ratio test).
Table 3
Alternative conditional logit regression.
Dependent variable = 1 if action is chosen; 0 otherwise
v (weight on payoff inequality) −0.006⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
s (weight on in-group altruism for artiﬁcial groups) 0.248⁎⁎⁎
(0.061)
σ (extra-weight on in-group altruism for national groups) −0.088
(0.068)
γ (weight on normative prescriptions) 1.398⁎⁎⁎
(0.104)
Pseudo R2 0.522
Bayesian Information Criterion 535.03
Number of Observations 2160
Standard errors are in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
163A. Barr et al. / Journal of Public Economics 164 (2018) 153–164hypothesis that direct utility derived from in-group altruism is indepen-
dent of the dimension of social identity that is salient in the decision-
making situation, and retain Eq. (2) as our preferred speciﬁcation of
utility.
5. Conclusion
We show that discrimination is perceived to be socially inappropri-
ate. However, the extent of this perceived inappropriateness depends
on the identities upon which discrimination is based: when the identi-
ties are deﬁned with reference to a brief, random event, discrimination
in favour of the in-group is viewed as less inappropriate than when the
identities are based on nationality. Furthermore, we show that discrimi-
nation in the allocator game is stronger in the settingwhere it is perceived
to be less inappropriate, and that, at the individual level, perceived inap-
propriateness predicts actual behaviour.
Ourﬁndings are supportive of a theoretical frameworkwithinwhich
taste-based discrimination is partly driven by normative considerations
about the appropriateness of discriminatory behaviour. We offer direct
evidence that, across choice contexts that are otherwise identical, differ-
ences in theway identity groups are deﬁned translate into differences in
the perceived normative prescriptions, and corresponding differences
in behaviour towards in-group and out-group members. These ﬁndings
are in line with models of social identity that have emphasised the role
of social norms, such as Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005).
Consistent with longstanding results from theminimal group litera-
ture, our study shows how remarkably easy it is to trigger discrimina-
tion between groups whose identities are based on artiﬁcial, trivial
characteristics. That we ﬁnd weaker discrimination on the basis of
more meaningful identity characteristics such as nationalities, and that
discrimination is perceived to bemore socially inappropriate in that set-
ting, suggests that shared norms opposing discrimination help moder-
ate this most natural of human inclinations.
We remain agnostic as to exactly why these norms opposing dis-
crimination are more strongly triggered by national identity than by
minimal group identity. National groups are different from minimal
groups in various ways, so there are multiple possible explanations.
We conjecture that a norm proscribing discrimination on the basis of
nationality is likely to have developed over time in a liberal society,
with a long history of in-migration, such as Britain, perhaps enhanced
by sensitivities about the negative historical effects of racism and xeno-
phobia. For these reasons, grouping participants by nationality seems
likely to invoke stronger norms against discrimination than if we
grouped themby other types of natural identity, such as university afﬁl-
iation (as implemented, for instance, in Ockenfels andWerner, 2014). In
the case of minimal groups, while their members have no directly rele-
vant norms to refer to, we argue that they are relatively likely to invoke
types of identity such as sports fandom and team game-playing, acrosswhich discrimination is considered harmless. It is also possible that
some participants under minimal group identity perceive that the ex-
perimenter intends for them to discriminate, and that this experimental
demand leads them to perceive a social norm in favour of
discrimination. These are matters for interesting future research.
While further investigation is needed, our ﬁndings are consistent
with and strongly suggest that shared norms opposing discrimination
do, as one would expect, help moderate discrimination. One likely im-
plication of this would be that if society allows such prohibitive social
norms to be eroded by whatever means, discrimination will increase.
This would be consistent with the recent co-emergence of a backlash
in various western countries against ‘political correctness’, spurred on
by leaders promoting nationalism and identity politics, and the
apparent rise in hostility towards immigrants and ethnic minorities in
these countries.
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